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I 
Quine has instilled new life into the old discussion of observation sentences since he 
took up the topic at the end of the 50s, though he has wavered on their import. A 
physical element concerned with the homology of sensory receptors which figured in 
earlier accounts has now been dropped (1996, pp. 160-1). In Word and Object he spoke 
of degrees of observationality with theory and collateral information diluting the pure 
observation sentences (pp. 42-4). Later, he tells us, 
I held observationality as absolute, based on immediacy of assent, and then I 
accommodated the intrusion of theory by contrasting the holophrastic 
conditioning of the observation sentence to neural intake with the analytic 
relations of the component words to the rest of language. The sentence figures 
holophrastically both in the infant’s first acquisition of it and in the scientist’s 
immediate assent to it when testing a theory. (1996, p. 162) 
An observation sentence understood as of 1996 is 
simply an occasion sentence that commands the subject’s immediate assent, 
however fallible and revisable. Fallibility is then accommodated in a separate 
dimension, theoreticity, which invests observation sentences in varying degrees. 
(loc. cit.) 
His view now squares quite nicely with that propounded just over 100 years ago 
by Duhem before the logical positivists introduced their notion of observation sentence 
which has notoriously gained all the bad press. Duhem describes how the scientist 
reconciles himself to the fallibility of first impressions by adopting the critical attitude 
afforded by his analysis of ordinary observation: 
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If therefore theoretical interpretation deprives the results of an experiment in 
physics of the immediate and indisputable certitude offered by the data of 
ordinary observation [données de l’observation vulgaire], it is, on the other hand, 
theoretical interpretation which permits scientific experiments to penetrate more 
deeply than common sense into phenomena in the analysis and description of 
detail. (1894, p. 213) 
“The finality of an experiment”, Quine says in near Duhemian idiom, “is historical, not 
logical” (1996, p. 163). And just as for Duhem, 
Physics is a symbolic painting to which continual retouching gradually gives 
comprehensiveness and unity, which forms in its entirety a more and more precise 
picture of the entirety of the facts of experience, while each detail of this picture, 
cut off and isolated from the whole, loses all significance and no longer represents 
anything. (1894, p. 197), 
so Quine sees increasing depth of analysis as emerging with the linking together of an 
ever broader range of sentences by shared descriptive terms. 
Finer points of difference would arguably emerge on a more detailed comparison, 
but one in particular leads to my concern in the present discussion. I think it reasonable 
to see a parallel between Quine’s notion of the emergence of an increasingly 
sophisticated ontological commitment with greater depth of analysis, and the 
“ontological order” Duhem sees reflected in “the logical order in which theory orders 
experimental laws” as it approaches the more complete form of a “natural 
classification” (Duhem 1954, pp. 26-7). Quine has been able to give a clearer general 
conception of the connection of ontology and logical order, which he has also tried to 
flesh out with more specific details. But he pays far more attention to the observational 
end of the spectrum than he does to the filling out of the middle ground and beyond. He 
wants to claim that observation sentences as such can be understood without recourse to 
ontology, and that this even applies to compound observation sentences. A special kind 
of compounding of observation sentences is invoked by Quine to link theory, which 
comprises standing sentences, with observation sentences which are occasion sentences. 
This is the observation categorical, itself a standing sentence, but one formed by 
compounding two observation sentences. Even these observation categoricals Quine 
says can be construed without prior ontological commitment. This I don’t understand. 
Observational compounds are required to report observation concomitance of one sort 
or another, and this often seems to require ontological presuppositions as far as I can 
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see. A parallel to this relinquishing of ontological presuppositions is to be found in the 
way intensional logics are sometimes advanced as an alternative to making certain 
ontological assumptions. Faced with the challenge to acknowledge either tacit 
ontological commitments or suppressed intensional structure, however, Quine might 
well prefer the former. 
A fuller exposition of Quine’s compounding of observation sentences is given in 
the next section. A comparison with Hume’s notion of constant conjunction is 
developed in section III to highlight the problem. Several examples involving the 
observation of concomitance are described in section IV. Finally, attention is drawn to 
some familiar strategies for capturing concomitance with intensional devices rather than 
ontological assumptions in section V. 
II 
Quine illustrates the compounding of observation sentences to yield further observation 
sentences in The Pursuit of Truth with two kinds of construction. Conjunction of 
observation sentences, as in “Rabbit and birds singing”, is a looser sort of connection 
than predication, as in “This pebble is blue”, or simply “Blue pebble”. “The conjunction 
is fulfilled so long as … each of the component observation sentences [is] fulfilled 
somewhere in the scene”—a rabbit here and birds singing over there—whereas “the 
predication focuses the two fulfilments, requiring them to coincide or amply overlap. 
The blue must encompass the pebble. It may also extend beyond; the construction is not 
symmetric” (p. 4). Later on Quine gives an example of a predication involving four 
observation sentences: 
(1) A white cat is facing a dog and bristling, 
or “White, dog-facing, bristling cat”. This, Quine thinks, could be learnt “by direct 
conditioning to the situation it reports” (pp. 29-30), but like his example of the 
chemist’s observation sentence “There’s copper in it!”, it is unlikely to have been learnt 
in that way, and is illustrative of an unlimited number of comparably complex 
observation sentences actually learnt by systematic construction on the basis of inter-
sentential relations. Observation sentences as Quine understands them therefore “far 
exceed the primitive ones which serve as the child’s entering wedge” into the language, 
and “which ones are learned directly by conditioning, and which ones indirectly through 
higher language, will vary from person to person” (p. 5). 
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How is such systematic construction possible? Quine talks here of “reification”—
in the case of (1), construing the combination more tightly than mere conjunction by 
introducing existential quantification, thus: “Something is a cat and is white and is dog-
facing and is bristling”. An object has been posited, an enduring cat. But an object 
existing from one time to another is more than is required by (1), taken in isolation as an 
observation sentence. A momentary conflation of features “all in the same part of the 
scene, superimposed” (1992, p. 29) is all that (1), considered as an observation 
sentence, involves. On Quine’s view, the occasion sentences which are observation 
sentences have a dual role. Considered as an integral part of the language, the same 
sentence can’t be treated holophrastically. It must be considered analytically, with a 
structure of parts in common with other sentences, in virtue of which the inter-sentential  
relations obtain and the systematic construction of complex sentences is possible. This 
involves the positing of objects, to which predicates can be truly or falsely applied. And 
of these objects we develop theories in which statements are made going beyond even 
what could be learnt by direct conditioning to the situations they report. Thus, cats as 
ordinarily conceived are enduring objects, and invoke reference to times and the use of 
relations of earlier and later. We say of them such things as 
(2) If a cat eats a spoiled fish and sickens, then it will thereafter avoid fish, 
and this cannot be treated as an observation sentence compounded of observation 
sentences by “if …, then …”. The pronoun “it” following “then” in (2) refers to the 
same thing as does “a cat” in the antecedent, although it is the subject of a description 
applying at later times in the consequent than the description applying to it in the 
antecedent. 
We have seen how observation sentences can, by Quine’s lights, be compounded 
to generate new observation sentences. But not all compounds of observation sentences 
are observation sentences. Quine distinguishes a compound of observation sentences 
which he calls the observation categorical. These are standing sentences of the kind 
“Whenever A, B”, where “A” and “B” are observation sentences, expressing “an 
irreducible generality prior to any objective reference … to the effect that the 
circumstances described in the one observation sentence are invariably accompanied by 
those described in the other”. Their status as standing sentences allows that they are, 
when construed analytically, the sort of thing that can be implied by a scientific theory. 
“It thus solves the problem of linking theory logically to observation, as well as 
epitomizing the experimental situation” (1992, p. 10). Quine (1994, p. 173) reaffirms 
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that he construes such observation categoricals as assuming no prior ontology, and in 
particular, none of places and times, only a conditioned association between for 
example “Here is smoke” and “Here is fire” which a child might be expected to 
command. In later stages of theory construction we return to these same observation 
categoricals, as we do with observation sentences in general, and construe them along 
the lines of sentences universally quantified over places and times in order to establish 
links with theory. 
How reasonable is this contention of Quine’s that complex observation of, let us 
say several factors together to put it in neutral terms, is independent of ontological 
assumptions? We can begin by comparing with Hume’s notion of constant conjunction. 
III 
Hume’s idea was that causation could be understood in terms of constant conjunction. 
Constant conjunction says something about two kinds of objects, but not merely that 
there are objects of each kind, nor merely that there are as many objects of each kind. 
Objects of each kind are paired off with one another in virtue of their conjunction. 
“Conjunction” is to be understood here as the astronomer, rather than the logician, uses 
the term. The modern logician wants to reserve the term “conjunction” for a sentential 
connective, and would use some other expression, say “occurring together”, for the 
relation between objects involved in causation. Hume, it seems, well understood these 
considerations: 
The idea, then, of causation must be deriv’d from some relation among objects; 
and that relation we must now endeavour to discover. I find in the first place, that 
whatever objects are consider’d as causes and effects, are contiguous; and that 
nothing can operate in a time or place, which is ever so little remov’d from those 
of its existence. Tho’ distant objects may sometimes seem productive of each 
other, they are commonly found upon examination to be link’d by a chain of 
causes, which are contiguous among themselves, and to the distant objects; and 
when in any particular instance we cannot discover this connexion, we still 
presume it to exist. We may therefore consider the relation of CONTIGUITY as 
essential to that of causation; at least may suppose it as such, according to the 
general opinion, till we can find a more [fn. referring to the later section I.IV.v] 
proper occasion to clear up this matter, by examining what objects are or are not 
susceptible of juxtaposition and conjunction. (Treatise, I.IV.ii; p. 75 in the 
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Niddich edition) 
Here we see a distinction between mediate and immediate causation, the contiguity 
requirements applying to the latter with distant causation allowed on the condition that 
there is a chain of events, in which each is an immediate cause of the next, linking 
distant cause and effect. 
As Hume says, his approach is based on some “relation among objects” pairing 
off events. Without some such relation of occurring together the idea of constant 
conjunction reduces to the unhelpful statement that events of one kind occur and events 
of another kind occur. Given a relation of occurring together defined between particular 
events in terms of their spatial and temporal contiguity, a relation of constant 
conjunction can be defined between kinds of events X and Y by saying that each event 
of kind X stands in a relation of occurring together with an event of kind Y. Asymmetry 
is then introduced with the requirement that the cause precedes the effect in time. Hume 
did express doubts about the contiguity condition. In section I.IV.v of the Treatise he 
considers that “Thought … and extension are qualities wholly incompatible”, and 
worries about “the soul[’s] … local conjunction with matter”, which leads him to 
wonder whether “it may not be improper to consider in general what objects are, or are 
not susceptible of a local conjunction” (pp. 234-5). The absurdities of “endeavouring to 
bestow a place on what is utterly incapable of it” (p. 238) may have convinced Hume 
that “our perceptions are not susceptible of a local union”. But he is not then at liberty 
to conclude that “as the constant conjunction of objects constitutes the very essence of 
cause and effect, matter and motion may often be regarded as the causes of thought, as 
far as we have any notion of that relation” (p. 250). For the relation of constant 
conjunction depends upon a relation of occurring together, and the only interpretation of 
this Hume has offered is one in terms of contiguity.  
One might still wonder what “objects” are “susceptible of juxtaposition and 
conjunction” and thus capable of sustaining Hume’s causal relation. Davidson (1980, p. 
149) suggests that they are events because of the temporal precedence relation they are 
held to stand in. But what of the contiguity relations? Billiard balls are taken as the 
paradigm, the white and the red ball being spatially contiguous when they touch. 
Billiard balls are certainly not events, however, but continuants, and it is difficult to see 
how temporal contiguity applies to them. The crucial point is that the balls touch at a 
time, and this time when the balls are spatially contiguous is of some duration—
otherwise, infinite forces would be required to achieve instantaneous change of 
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momentum. Temporal contiguity is reasonably interpreted in the same way as spatial 
contiguity as exhibited by the colliding billiard balls, namely as juxtaposition or 
abutment, rather than as simultaneity.  But then if what each ball, considered by itself, is 
doing when they collide gives us the events standing in the causal relation, spatial 
contiguity excludes temporal contiguity.  The situation is not improved by considering 
an instant of time at the onset of the collision for the problem still remains that at this 
instant of first touching, the times are simultaneous. Resorting to the device of adding 
temporal “tails” to the balls’ doings during collision, so that the one event is construed 
as including the white ball’s sweeping out a region of space up to the collision as well 
as being in contact at collision, while the other includes the red’s sweeping out a region 
of space after the collision as well as its being in contact with the white during collision, 
is ad hoc.  Certainly, it is formally possible to construe the “earlier than” relation as 
standing between such overlapping times, and not only mereologically separate times, 
so that the event involving the white ball can be said to be earlier than that involving the 
red on the proposed construal.  But temporal contiguity must then be construed 
differently from spatial contiguity, overlapping being included in the one case and 
excluded in the other. Davidson was wise not to mention spatial contiguity. It seems 
that spatial contiguity is intelligibly sustained by continuants, and temporal contiguity 
by events, but what the “objects” are which occur together in Hume’s sense remains a 
mystery. 
It is interesting to note that Descartes, who wouldn’t contemplate action at a 
distance, believed that action by contact is transmitted instantaneously. Quine meets the 
problem by taking constant conjunction as a primitive idea, “an irreducible generality 
prior to any objective reference … to the effect that the circumstances described in the 
one observation sentence are invariably accompanied by those described in the other” 
expressed by his observation categoricals. “Whenever A, B”, where “A” and “B” are 
observation sentences, is to somehow capture the idea that each circumstance described 
by A is accompanied by a corresponding circumstance described by B, where being 
accompanied by expresses something tighter than conjunction. But this is not to be 
understood as saying there are such things as circumstances, and so nothing is said to 
actually accompany anything. Circumstances are not the sort of thing that could be 
referred to. Responding to the problem of how his earlier dichotomy of stimulation and 
intersubjectivity conditions go together, in view of the fact that different subjects can’t 
be said to have the same stimulations, Quine rejected Davidson’s proposal of 
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accounting for intersubjective likeness of stimulation by locating the stimulus in the 
nearest shared cause of the pertinent behaviour of the two subjects because of “the 
awkward heterogeneity of the subject matter”: 
Usually it is not so nicely segregated as Mama or rabbits. “It’s raining” and “It’s 
cold” are more to the point, and I am reluctant to settle for situations as points of 
reference. They are of a piece with facts and propositions, whereas nerve endings 
afford a clearly individuated, homogeneous domain. (1993, p. 114) 
We have seen that Quine now dispenses with homology of sensory receptors. But that 
doesn’t impugn his rejection of situations as points of reference. He also rejects 
spatiotemporal coincidence as the basis of a relation of togetherness underlying his 
observational categoricals, however, and understands “Whenever” as a dyadic sentential 
connective. 
The introduction of the observation categorical at a point where Hume realised, if 
somewhat faultingly, that there is a problem to be addressed and which required, as he 
thought, reference to space and time, obscures details we might have hoped would be 
explicitly elaborated and so seems unilluminatingly ad hoc. It might be said that Quine 
cannot be faulted merely for taking certain concepts as primitive. On the other hand, 
mere choice of primitives cannot settle matters of ontological commitment, just as 
failure to use variables is not itself sufficient to circumvent the need for a Tarski style 
notion of satisfaction. There is, in fact, a hint of fudging over the distinction between 
connective and relation in Quine’s explanation of observational conjunction, said to be 
fulfilled, as we saw, “so long as … each of the component observation sentences [is] 
fulfilled somewhere in the scene”, in so far as being part of the same scene suggests 
temporal proximity. Conjunction, understood as a connective, implies merely that the 
component sentences be fulfilled, and carries no implication of spatial or temporal 
proximity or other relation unless implied by references to spaces and times in the 
component sentences. Since this is just the sort of point Quine has emphasised in his 
doctrine of ontological commitment, it is tempting to interpret Quine’s explanation so 
that the suggested implication of temporal proximity is not intended. Otherwise, it is 
difficult to see that reification over times is not involved in the notion of an observation 
conjunction. In fact, since scenes are presumably in the same boat as situations, and 
“fulfilled somewhere” is presumably not to be interpreted literally as “there is some 
place p where the sentence is fulfilled”, the final phrase “somewhere in the scene” can 
presumably be dropped from the definition of observation conjunction. Observation 
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conjunction is just conjunction of observation sentences. But this is to repudiate any 
sense of togetherness, whereas spatiotemporal coincidence seems so clearly to be 
Quine’s intent. 
IV 
Observational concomitance obviously plays an important role in science, and 
compound observation sentences must reflect this if observation sentences are to have 
any relevance to scientific procedure. Noticing the truth of unlikely or unfamiliar 
compounds is a valuable trait of the “observant” scientist, and the unexpected conflation 
of conditions may lead to hitherto unformulated hypotheses with fruitful practical 
applications or theoretical insights. This seems to be well illustrated by an incident in 
the life of the metallurgist Harry Brearley. 
One fine day in 1913, Brearley was out walking in Sheffield when a flash of 
reflected sunlight from a heap of rusty scrap metal caught his eye. He could hardly have 
been the only one to notice a flash of sunlight reflected from the heap. But he was the 
only one to realise that it was unusual for parts of a rusty heap of scrap to shine, and he 
rummaged around in search of shiny pieces of metal among the rusty remains, analysed 
them and discovered they were composed of iron mixed with 14% chromium. 
(Although he didn’t know it, the heap contained the remains of gun barrels made of 
trial-and-error mixtures for new alloy steels and tested to destruction.) His 
investigations led to the development of stainless steels with 20% chromium and 10% 
nickel.1 
What kind of compound observation was it that aroused Brearley’s interest? It 
wasn’t simply an observation conjunction “Shiny and rusty”, because the component 
observation sentences were connected and not independently fulfilled. The relevant 
features occurred together, spatially and temporally, although nothing was both shiny 
and rusty: he set about sorting the shiny pieces of metal from the rusty pieces. It seems 
that the situation cannot be described by either a simple observation conjunction or an 
observation predication. But we might try a more complex combination of these. The 
heap of scrap was partly shiny—heap encompassing, in Quine’s words, shiny—and 
partly rusty. How does an observation conjunction of two observation predications, 
“Shiny heap and rusty heap”, fare? It doesn’t fit the bill, unfortunately, because the heap 
 
1I heard this story in a talk by Michael Akeroyd, who uses it to illustrate Popper’s “conjecture and refutation” 
approach to scientific investigation; see Akeroyd (1992). 
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is the same in the two cases, and this is not required by observation conjunction. Nor is 
the situation like that described by (1), because what is shiny is not, as I say, rusty, and 
conversely. It is difficult to see how Brearley’s observation can be accounted for by the 
resources of Quinean compound observation. 
Suppose, on the other hand, that reference of a primitive sort is countenanced to 
regions of space and time, considered not as sets of points, but as extended “solids” 
standing in mereological relations of parthood, overlap, and so on. Then the compound 
observation can be captured by mass disjunction as this is defined in the theory of mass 
predication (Röper 1983). There are regions, p and q, such that p is shiny and q is rusty 
and the sum of p and q (i.e. that region whose every part either overlaps p or overlaps q) 
is a heap of scrap metal. Distinguishing material bodies from the regions they occupy 
and attributing features to them rather than the regions they occupy might be viewed as 
a more sophisticated development in ontology which could be traced in more detail. 
Concomitance of another kind arises when processes are timed. In former days, 
timing was often left to the ear because the eyes were too much absorbed by the events 
in one region to attend to clock readings in another. Problems thereby engendered are 
vividly illustrated by the tale of Kinnebrook, the Observer Royal at the Greenwich 
observatory who, “as every psychologist knows” (Boring 1957, p. 134), dismissed his 
assistant Maskelyne in 1796 because Maskelyne’s observed transit times for stars were 
almost a second later than his own. I will take up an example from the early days of 
chemical kinetics. 
In their pioneering work on the study of the rate at which chemical reactions 
proceed, Harcourt and Esson followed the course of a reaction in which hydrogen 
peroxide liberates iodine from hydrogen iodide. Their task was to estimate the amount 
of iodine released during successive stages of the reaction. The presence of iodine is 
shown by the familiar blue colour it produces with a starch indicator. Equally sized 
drops of a strong sodium hyposulphite solution were added in succession. The 
hyposulphite recombines the iodine into hydrogen iodide at a much faster rate than that 
of the principal reaction—to all intents and purposes instantaneously—and renders the 
solution colourless until the hyposulphite is used up and excess iodine suddenly 
produces the blue colour once more. In the course of a description of the painstaking 
precautions taken to overcome the many difficulties in making the measurements, 
Harcourt describes the timing of the successive stages as follows: 
an experiment was … made to date … from the first appearance of the blue colour 
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[after mixing the principle reagents]. In order that the second at which this change 
occurred might be accurately noted, the cylinder [in which the reaction proceeded] 
was placed on a sheet of white paper, in good light, and opposite to it was 
stationed a clock, beating seconds. … The observations were made by looking 
down upon the column of fluid and watching the appearance of the disc forming 
its upper surface, listening, at the same time, to the beat of the clock, and counting 
the seconds. So suddenly does the blue shade pass over the clear and brightly 
illuminated disc, that a practised observer can generally feel sure as to the second 
in which the change begins, and where the reaction is proceeding very rapidly it 
would often be possible to subdivide the second. As soon as the observation had 
been made, a drop of hyposulphite was introduced, which speedily restores the 
liquid to its normal colourless condition. (Harcourt 1867, p. 479) 
The time that elapses between two successive appearances of the blue colour becomes 
continually greater as the amount of peroxide in the solution diminishes; and, finally, 
the last measure of hyposulphite requires for its conversion more iodine than the 
residual dioxide can furnish, and the blue colour never returns. 
The colouring of the disk is observed concomitantly with, say, the ninth beat of 
the clock, or more precisely (since Harcourt quotes times to two decimal places), the 
colouring is observed to occur at a point within the interval between the ninth and tenth 
beats. The relevant notion of concomitance is a temporal one, and would seem to imply 
the existence of times. There is a time during which the colour change occurs, and this 
is a part of the time during which the ninth and tenth beats are heard. 
Other examples such as the siren of a passing ambulance falling in pitch and 
decreasing in intensity, or of its getting colder as dusk falls, are not so easily pinned 
down to definite spatial regions. But they do involve a fixed time; and then it is easily 
ascertained that people in the neighbourhood agree on the observational concomitance 
at the time in question, and others don’t, which serves to broadly delimit a spatial 
region. It seems that spatiotemporal reference, or at any rate temporal reference, is a 
minimum requirement for useful notion of observational concomitance. 
V 
The idea that two conditions can hold at the same time needn’t necessarily be seen as 
entailing the existence of times has been developed in the discipline of tense logic as 
originally conceived by Arthur Prior. On Prior’s view, a simple past-tensed statement 
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like “John has gone” should be rendered in the form Pj, where j is understood as a 
present-tensed sentence “John goes” and the past tense of the original sentence is 
rendered by the application of the sentential operator P read “It was the case that”. A 
further sentential operator, F, read “It will be the case that”, is introduced to capture 
future-tensed idioms. The obtaining of circumstances at different times can be 
expressed by a conjunction with this apparatus. That j is the case before y is expressed 
by a disjunction of conjunctions: 
  P(Pj ∧ y)  ∨  (Pj ∧ y)  ∨  F(Pj ∧ y). 
Given that sentences are all understood to have an implicit temporal character2 within 
the context of tense logic, a conjunction j ∧ y in which no tense operators occur does 
express a sort of temporal togetherness without resort to a relation. 
In the same Priorean spirit, an analogous treatment of “holds somewhere else” as 
an intensional sentential operator has been proposed by von Wright (1983). He suggests 
the basic normal modal system K augmented with the “Brouwerian” axiom and ♢♢j  
⊃. j ∨ ♢j is adequate for ♢ interpreted as “holds somewhere else”. An unmodalised 
sentence in this context can be interpreted as holding here—i.e. nowhere else: putting 
j materially equivalent to ~♢j doesn’t lead to a contradiction because the familiar 
modal axiom j ⊃ ♢j doesn’t hold for this interpretation of ♢. An unmodalised 
conjunction in this context accordingly expresses the spatial togetherness of two 
circumstances without resort to a relation. 
Now it is well-known that the expressive power of ordinary tense constructions 
exceeds the resources of Prior’s tense logic and involves the ontological presuppositions 
of quantification over times. But cases where further expressive power is called for are 
relatively unusual, and become more so if the addition of certain operators 
complementing Prior’s original arsenal is allowed. Might not tense logic be suitable for 
the primitive constructions required for the composition of ontologically non-committal 
observation sentences, and in particular, observational concomitance? 
 
2  Prior expresses this universal implicit temporal character by saying that every 
sentence can be given a reading beginning with a present-tense expression “It is the 
case that”. Even Pj can be read “It is the case that it was the case that it is the case 
that j”, and so on. 
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There are problems with this plan. For one thing, the expressive weakness of tense 
logic also encompasses absence of spatial character. It would have to be shown that 
tense logic can be satisfactorily combined with von Wright’s language of spatial 
inflection. Given Prior’s own concerns, he might well have been willing to accept a 
solution whereby explicit reference to space is allowed in the form of variables. But that 
wouldn’t suit Quine’s purposes. 
An even greater obstacle would be that of explaining the relation between 
observation and theory. Quine solves the problem of relating the standing sentences of 
theory to the occasion sentences of observation, we saw, by his device of the 
observation categorical. Even if Quine were happy with an intensional logic as the 
vehicle for the expression of the conceptual paucity of the language of observation 
sentences, how would this be squared with the extensional language of theory? 
Difficulties aside, the picture may not be altogether unattractive, however. Quine 
(1994a) presents extensionality as a goal worth striving for rather than an undiscussible 
dogma, in view of which it might seem appropriate that full-blown extensionality 
emerges only at the theoretical level where the ontological price for the elimination of 
intensional operators can be properly assessed. 
VI 
Quine pictures ontology emerging with an ever more sophisticated and interlocking 
theoretical framework from the simple beginnings of isolated observations. Reification 
begins with the use of referential pronouns, and proceeds, via the “intimately 
interdependent developments” (1994, p. 177) of the framework of space and time and 
the individuation of bodies across time, to the abstract entities of quantum mechanics 
and mathematics. I have tried to argue that reification begins a little earlier in this 
scheme of things than Quine supposes. I would also venture to remark that surprisingly 
little is said about the middle ground concerned with a variation in middle-sized objects 
and a variety of observable macroscopic phenomena which Aristotle sought to 
systematise and even today is approached in terms of macroscopic theories which 
haven’t been eclipsed by small talk about abstruse particles. 
Regimentation of theses and theories of this order, promoting what Duhem 
understood to be the analysis of immediate observation afforded by science, would 
illuminate the nature of ordinary bodies and the associated ontology. This task is not 
met by revisionary suggestions that a body be “[v]iewed four-dimensionally … [as] the 
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content of a portion of space-time” (Quine 1994, p. 177) and the distinction between 
events and continuants simply abandoned. Thus, the naive observation that the wooden 
desktop is warmer than the metal paper-weight. As with the observation of a bent stick 
half-immersed in water, the judgement is corrected, in this case with the explanation 
that the two objects have been in the room sufficiently long to have come to thermal 
equilibrium. The feeling of coldness on touching the metal object is explained by the 
existence of a noticeable event, namely the heating of the paper-weight by my hand, 
which body metabolism maintains at a higher temperature. The specific heat and poor 
conductivity of wood mean that the corresponding heating of the desktop is too small to 
be noticeable. Having a certain temperature is a macroscopic phenomenon, instantiated 
by a body occupying a sizeable region of space during an appreciable interval of time. 
Bodies don’t have temperatures for instants. The simple temporal character of 
observation is not reflected in the Priorean metaphysics of tensed determinations and 
the unreality of time, but in the fact that circumstances hold for—during—times which 
have parts and are parts of others. Similarly for space. The spatio-temporal ontology can 
be developed within an elementary first-order theory based on mereology, and the basic 
properties of bodies and processes explored within such a framework. Observation 
should be properly connected with this end of science, which should be given more 
attention before rushing off into the realms of space-time and uncertainty. 
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